Opinion Summary: A.A.R.P. v. Trump, Case No. 24A1007 | Date Decided: 5/16/25

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The Question Presented is: Whether Venezuelan nationals detained as alleged members of a terrorist organization are entitled to constitutionally adequate notice and opportunity to challenge their removal before being deported under the Alien Enemies Act, and if so, what minimum notice requirements must the government provide to satisfy due process.

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The Court reasoned that the detainees’ interests at stake are accordingly particularly weighty. Under these circumstances, notice roughly 24 hours before removal, de¬void of information about how to exercise due process rights to contest that removal, surely does not pass muster. But it is not optimal for this Court, far removed from the circumstances on the ground, to determine in the first in¬stance the precise process necessary to satisfy the Constitution in this case. We remand the case to the Fifth Circuit for that purpose.

The Supreme Court forbid the Government from removing the named plaintiffs or putative class members in this action under the Alien Enemies Act pending order by the Fifth Circuit and disposition of the petition for a writ of certiorari, if such writ is timely sought.

Voting Details: The Supreme Court delivered a Per Curiam opinion. Justice Kavanaugh wrote a concurring opinion. Justice Alito wrote a dissenting opinion, with whom Justice Thomas joined.

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Plain Language Breakdown:

In this case, the Supreme Court decided that Venezuelan nationals detained by the government as alleged members of a terrorist organization must receive adequate notice before being removed from the United States under the Alien Enemies Act. The Court found that the District Court's inaction for over 14 hours constituted a constructive denial of the detainees' request for emergency relief, and that due process requires notice that allows detainees a meaningful opportunity to challenge their removal through habeas proceedings. The Court vacated the Fifth Circuit's dismissal of the appeal and granted an injunction preventing the government from removing class members until the Fifth Circuit could determine what level of notice is constitutionally required.

Justice Kavanaugh concurred, agreeing with the temporary injunction but expressing a preference for the Supreme Court to resolve the critical legal issues promptly rather than remanding to lower courts. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, arguing that the Court lacked jurisdiction because the District Court's actions were reasonable given the circumstances and insufficient evidence was presented to prove imminent harm to the detainees; he also questioned whether class relief could be obtained in habeas proceedings and whether the requirements for class certification could be met in this case

Summary of Per Curiam Opinion:

The President has invoked the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) to remove Venezuelan nationals who are members of Tren de Aragua (TdA), a designated foreign terrorist organization. Applicants are two detainees identified as members of TdA and a putative class of similarly situated detainees in the Northern District of Texas. All of the alleged TdA members in the putative class are currently being held in U. S. detention facilities. In the application before the Court, the detainees seek injunctive relief against summary removal under the AEA.

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t “tomorrow . . . starts at: 12:01

At: 12:52

The Fifth Circuit erred in dismissing the detainees’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Appellate courts have jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders that have “the practical effect of refusing an injunction.” A district court’s in¬action in the face of extreme urgency and a high risk of “serious, perhaps irreparable,” consequences may have the effect of refusing an injunction.

Here the District Court’s inaction—not for 42 minutes but for 14 hours and 28 minutes—had the practical effect of refusing an injunction to detainees facing an imminent threat of severe, irreparable harm. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals. “[T]he Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to due process of law in the context of removal proceedings.” “Procedural due process rules are meant to protect” against “the mistaken or unjustified deprivation of life, liberty, or property.”

We have long held that “no person shall be” removed from the United States “with¬out opportunity, at some time, to be heard.”. Due process re¬quires notice that is “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties” and that “afford[s] a reasonable time . . . to make [an] appearance.” Accordingly, in J.G.G., this Court explained—with all nine Justices agreeing—that “AEA detainees must receive notice . . . that they are subject to removal under the Act . . . within a reasonable time and in such a manner as will allow them to actually seek habeas relief ” before removal. In order to “actually seek habeas relief,” a detainee must have sufficient time and information to reasonably be able to con¬tact counsel, file a petition, and pursue appropriate relief.

The Government does not contest before this Court the applicants’ description of the notice afforded to AEA detainees in the Northern District of Texas, nor the assertion that the Government was poised to carry out removals imminently. The Government has represented elsewhere that it is unable to provide for the return of an individual deported in error to a prison in El Salvador, where it is alleged that detainees face indefinite detention. The detainees’ interests at stake are accordingly particularly weighty. Under these circumstances, notice roughly 24 hours before removal, de¬void of information about how to exercise due process rights to contest that removal, surely does not pass muster. But it is not optimal for this Court, far removed from the circumstances on the ground, to determine in the first in¬stance the precise process necessary to satisfy the Constitution in this case. We remand the case to the Fifth Circuit for that purpose.

To be clear, we decide today only that the detainees are entitled to more notice than was given on April 18, and we grant temporary injunctive relief to preserve our jurisdiction while the question of what notice is due is adjudicated. We did not on April 19—and do not now—address the underlying merits of the parties’ claims regarding the legality of removals under the AEA. We recognize the significance of the Government’s national security interests as well as the necessity that such interests be pursued in a manner consistent with the Constitution. In light of the foregoing, lower courts should address AEA cases expeditiously.

The dissent disputes both the Court’s jurisdiction and the availability of class wide relief. We do not find its reasoning persuasive. First, we reject the dissent’s characterization of the events that transpired on April 18, which lead it to question our jurisdiction. District courts should approach requests for preliminary relief with care and consideration, but exigent circumstances may impose practical constraints. Preliminary relief is “customarily granted on the basis of procedures that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.”

The purpose of such relief is “merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties” pending further proceedings.

In this case, the record before the District Court, although limited, indicated that removals of putative class members were likely imminent. The detainees attached four declarations to their emergency motion for a TRO. In one, for example, an attorney relayed a detainee’s report that immigration officers “had informed them that they will be de¬ported either today or tomorrow.” In a second, a nonprofit director described conversations with family members of detainees and linked to a video of detainees holding notices of removal as evidence that detainees “were being removed.”

U. S. C. §: 1651

Finally, this Court may properly issue temporary injunctive relief to the putative class in order to preserve our jurisdiction pending appeal.

Justice Kavanaugh Concurring Opinion:

temporary injunction. The injunction simply ensures that the Judiciary can decide whether these Venezuelan detainees may be lawfully removed under the Alien Enemies Act before they are in fact removed. The underlying legal questions that the courts may need to decide before the removals occur include: (i) whether the Alien Enemies Act (as distinct from the ordinary removal process under the Immigration and Nationality Act) authorizes removal of these detainees and (ii) if so, what notice is due before removal. Several Federal District Courts have already issued conflicting rulings on the underlying legal issues.

The Executive Branch and the detainees agree about the urgency and importance of those legal questions: The Executive Branch has represented that this case is important for America’s national security and that it is “critical to remove TdA members subject to the Proclamation quickly.” For their part, the detainees have explicitly requested that the Court move fast and grant certiorari before judgment.

The circumstances call for a prompt and final resolution, which likely can be provided only by this Court. At this juncture, I would prefer not to remand to the lower courts and further put off this Court’s final resolution of the critical legal issues. Rather, consistent with the Executive Branch’s request for expedition—and as the detainees themselves urge—I would grant certiorari, order prompt briefing, hold oral argument soon thereafter, and then resolve the legal issues.

Justice Alito Dissenting Opinion:

I cannot join the decision of the Court. First and most important, we lack jurisdiction and therefore have no authority to issue any relief. Second, even if we had such authority, the applicants have not satisfied the requirements for the issuance of injunctive relief pending appellate re¬view. Third, granting certiorari before any decision on the merits has been made by either the District Court or the Court of Appeals is unwarranted.

U. S. C. §: 1254

This theory rests on a mischaracterization of what happened in the District Court. I do not dispute that a district court’s failure to act expeditiously may, in some circumstances, have “the practical effect of refusing an injunction” and thus entitle a party to take an interlocutory appeal. But that principle does not apply here where (a) the District Court had no good reason to think that either A. A. R. P. or W. M. M. was in imminent danger of removal, (b) the record at that time contained only sketchy evidence about any imminent threat to members of the class of alien detainees they sought to have certified, (c)the court took the entirely reasonable position that it would wait for the Government to respond to the applicants’ re¬quest for a temporary restraining order (TRO) before acting, (d) the court set a very short deadline for the filing of the Government’s response, and (e) the court was working diligently on the difficult issues presented by the applicants’ request for relief for themselves and the members of the putative class.

r renewed motion for a TRO at: 12:34

It was not until their: 12:48

Faced with applicants’ extraordinary demand, the District Court proceeded in an entirely reasonable manner. The Court characterizes the District Court’s behavior during the period in question as “inaction,” but in my judgment, that is unfair. Rather, as the judge has noted, he “was working with utmost diligence to resolve[the] important and complicated issues [presented by the motion] as quickly as possible.”. The judge explained that he had not yet ruled because he could not “shirk [his] responsibility to decide . . . complicated is¬sues of law without at least some opportunity to review the pleadings and attachments and to get thoughtful responses from the parties.” And the judge “was prepared to issue an order” “as soon as practicable after the government filed its response shortly after midnight, if not sooner.”

As I mentioned, the factual support provided to the District Court was weak. The Court claims that the facts presented to the District Court on April 18 showed that there was an emergency entailing a high risk of “serious, perhaps irreparable, consequences.” (internal quotation marks omitted). But it is important not to conflate the in¬formation that was in the record on April 18 with the new information that was presented to this Court several days later. The record that was before the District Court on April 18 (which is the same record that was before us at midnight on that date) included no concrete evidence that any removals were so imminent that a ruling had to be made immediately. The applicants’ factual support consisted of six sworn declarations and a photograph that the applicants asserted was an image of a notice of removal. But neither the declarations nor the photograph showed “extreme urgency.”

Even if the District Court had denied the applicants’ motion, there would be no ground for reversal because the applicants failed to satisfy the requirements for emergency injunctive relief, one of which is a showing of likelihood of success on the merits. And here, in order to obtain what the application sought (and what the Court now provides)—i.e., relief for the members of the class that applicants asked to have certified—applicants had to show that they were likely to establish that class relief is available in a habeas proceeding and, if such relief is available, that the standard requirements for class certification could likely be met.

First, it is doubtful that class relief may be obtained in a habeas proceeding. We have never so held, and it is highly questionable whether it is permitted. Although habeas proceedings are classified as civil, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply only “to the extent that the practice in [habeas] proceedings . . . previously conformed to the practice in civil actions.” And in accordance with Rule 81, we have acknowledged that some Federal Rules are inapplicable in habeas.

Where a particular rule does not apply in habeas, a court cannot circumvent that limitation by simply saying that it is importing the same feature under a different rubric. The Harris case concluded that something like an interrogatory was allowed because it was needed under the circumstances to help the habeas court carry out a duty clearly imposed by law, that is, to “‘determine the facts’” that are material to the claim made by the petitioner who was before the court.

The situation here is different. No provision of law imposes on a habeas court the duty to determine facts or decide legal issues regarding parties who are not before the court. And as a general matter, the class action device is uniquely “ill-suited” for habeas proceedings, which often turn on individualized and fact-specific determinations regarding the confinement of a specific prisoner.

Instead of merely ruling on the application that is before us—which asks for emergency relief pending appeal—the Court takes the unusual step of granting certiorari before judgment, summarily vacating the judgment below dis¬missing the applicants’ appeal, and remanding the case to the Court of Appeals with directions regarding the issues that court should address. From the Court’s order, it is not entirely clear whether the Court has silently decided issues that go beyond the question of interim relief. (I certainly hope that it has not.) But if it has done so, today’s order is doubly extraordinary. Granting certiorari before a court of appeals has entered a judgment is a sharp departure from usual practice, but here neither the Court of Appeals nor the District Court has decided any merits questions. We have said more times than I care to remember that “we are a court of review, not first view.” Even on the Court’s reading of what happened below, all that the District Court and the Court of Appeals decided was that the applicants were not entitled to temporary injunctive relief. If the Court has gone beyond that question, it has blazed a new trail. It has plucked a case from a district court and decided important issues in the first instance. To my eyes, that looks far too much like an expansion of our original jurisdiction.

I must therefore respectfully dissent.